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Introduction1)
 The circumstances surrounding Japanese public works are changing. Despite the fact that the 
central government and local governments are in financial difficulties, they are still required to 
spend money not only for new construction of public works, but also for maintenance of older 
projects. The necessity of spending on maintenance projects is increasing because many public 
works that were built in the 1950’s and 1960’s are in disrepair.2) In addition, in an aging society 
such as Japan, it would seem important to respond to local needs by providing local means of 
transportation, for example, buses, which have a small turning radius, and streetcars, rather than to 
embark on major public works like airports and bridges.
 The degrees of decay in public works however, differ by region. If local governments do not have 
their own funding to implement their administrative projects, they have to depend on the central 
government for budget resources. As a result, they tend to favor projects with high reimbursement 
rates from the central government over those that have a high level of demand from local residents. 
In other words, local public policy is influenced by money from the central government. Thus, 
in order to implement public works based on local needs, it is necessary for local governments 
to decrease their dependence on monetary resources from the central government and increase 
autonomy in their budgets.
 In Japan, the reform of the public works system, especially revenue sources, has not made 
much progress since the 1990’s. Even though some individual subsidies are consolidated in 
block subsidies, local governments are still influenced and restricted by the rules of the central 
government. Therefore, it is difficult for local governments to use money from the central 
government in a flexible way. The special source for road projects like gasoline tax was changed 
to a general revenue source in 2009. This did not, however, bring about a significant change in 
the way these funds are spent. Besides, when the central government’s projects in local areas are 
implemented by the central government, even though local governments share the cost, information 
about these projects is not accessible to local governments, and it is difficult for them to have any 
influence in these undertakings. The only way the local governments can make their voices heard is 
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by not paying their share of the cost of the projects.
 In the United States, on the other hand, the way of using the Highway Trust Fund created by 
the federal gasoline tax was changed by the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 
1991 (ISTEA). Previously, the Highway Trust Fund was basically used only for federal highway 
projects. ISTEA, however, provided states and local government officials with added flexibility in 
using the Highway Trust Fund not only for highways, but also for other transportations projects, 
such as subways and buses. In addition, ISTEA changed the decision-making process in federal 
highway projects. Previously, highway and related projects were decided by the federal government 
and state highway departments. On the contrary, in ISTEA, the relationships among the federal 
government, state departments of transportation, and local governments were changed. Since 
ISTEA was enacted, transportation projects including highways have been implemented by the 
federal government, state highway departments, and metropolitan planning organizations (MPOs). 
In other words, ISTEA strengthened the role of MPOs3) in project selection, allowing them to take 
cost and benefit into consideration.4) ISTEA also promoted the participation of local residents and 
delegates of major public transportation groups in the process of metropolitan planning.
 The Federal Aid Highway Act, which governs highway projects, expired on the appointed day 
and has been revised and changed.5) But it was not until 1991 that major changes were made.
 The purpose of this study is to ascertain the driving forces of the policy change of public 
works in Japan to reflect social and economic conditions and to respond to local needs through 
investigating the reasons for policy change in transportation including highways in the United 
States.
 Generally speaking, it is difficult to compare the United States and Japan because the U.S 
government is based on federalism, while Japan has a somewhat centralized system. In the case of 
highways in the United States, however, state and local governments depend on a federal Highway 
Trust Fund, which derives its revenue from federal gas taxes, and is, in turn, under restrictions 
from the federal government. So, there is a similarity in budget systems for road projects between 
Japan and the United States. For this reason, this study will make a comparison between Japan and 
the United States to ascertain factors of policy change in road projects and to show the causes of 
differences in policy change between Japan and the United States.
 What promoted the change of highway policy, which had centralized systems for a long time 
under federalism in the United States, to give states and local government’s flexibility in spending 
the Highway Trust Fund and gave the MPOs the opportunity to participate in project selection?
 The research will be conducted as follows.
 First, this study will set up a hypothesis to analyze the policy change in highways. Second, this 
study will present common features in road projects and their systems between the United States 
and Japan, followed by the outcome of the revisions in the two countries. Third will be case studies 
to gather information about the process of ISTEA enactment and decentralization to MPOs by this 
act from congressional discussions and interviews. Following this, there will be an analysis of the 
factors related to highway policy changes according to the hypothesis of this study that will be set 
up referring to previous studies. Then this study will show the problem of institutional reform and 
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prospects for public works in Japan.
Angles of Analysis
 As Hall (1993) and Hogwood (1982) have mentioned in relation to policy change, it is difficult 
to realize policy change that alters the object of the policy.6) In general, because actors who have 
been invested in existing policy and benefited in some way from it do not have the incentive to 
change that policy, it is difficult to consider that such individuals would want to effect changes of 
existing policy and institutions. In addition, people who have benefited from existing policy have 
been protected and held a dominant position due to the system of that policy. They have used their 
status to attain monopolized benefits from the policy and have tried to destroy any challenges from 
adversaries to undermine the policy monopoly.
 In the policy of public works in Japan, public government ministries take into consideration 
the opinion of Zoku-Giin7), in policy making and Zoku-Giin influence the budget and the design 
of institutions. For example, the Doro-Zoku (one type of Zoku-giin who specializes in road 
policy) resisted the privatization of a public road corporation and confronted Prime Minister 
Junichiro Koizumi who attempted to reform the corporation and influenced the institution after its 
privatization.
 Highway policy change that modifies the usage of the Highway Trust Fund from only for 
highway projects to other transportation projects including highway projects, however, was realized 
in the United States.
 In the United States, legislators generally draw up acts considering requests from voters and 
lobbyists. In the process of this decision-making, alliances among legislators are created in the 
process of discussion and the various groups will bargain with each other. How do legislators take 
part in the decision-making for public works policy? And what are the features of this decision-
making? What kind of actions of legislators will realize policy change in public works? To make 
clear these research questions, this study set angles of analysis and hypotheses referring to previous 
studies about policy and institutional change mention the mechanisms of policy change.
Hypothesis
 The studies of policy change by Hall (1993) and Hogwood (1982) mention the classification 
of policy change, but not how policy change is realized. In other words, they do not mention the 
mechanisms of policy change. Thus, this study will examine previous studies of policy change that 
focus on such mechanisms.
 Studies of mechanisms of policy change are varied from the standpoints of subjects, 
opportunities, and incentives. This study refers to previous studies of policy change that focus on 
actors’ interactions or conflicts of actors’ coalitions to set up a hypothesis for policy change in road 
projects.
 The factors related to policy change from previous studies vary: monitoring or personnel 
reshuffling of bureaucrats by politicians who have to pay attention to the needs of their voters to 
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be reelected, and a rise of attention from politicians by lobbying and the movement of voters. In 
addition, there are other factors of policy change from previous studies: the existence of policy 
entrepreneurs who propose new policies or systems to arrange the interest among politicians and 
the success in expanding new policies or systems by policy losers who had been on the periphery of 
policy and had not benefited from existing policy.
 According to Schickler (2001), it is difficult to realize institutional reform as a result of conflicts 
between legislators’ interests in Congress. If an entrepreneur devises innovations that serve as 
common carriers, however, momentarily uniting those dissatisfied with the status quo8), he/she 
can play a role as an organizer and promote institutional reform. Baumgartner and Jones (2009) 
stressed the relation between actors who oppose the existing system and policy change. They 
mention that, although multiple policy venues are not inhibitors of change, they are opportunities 
to change the policy monopoly.9) According to these authors, “the existence of multiple policy 
venues is especially critical in the process of disrupting policy monopolies.”10) They also noted that, 
when new ideas are diffused rapidly through linked policy venues, building up momentum through 
positive feedback,11) the opponents have more influence. Political actors recognize this and use it 
for their own purposes. This encourages rapid change.12) In other words, if opponents have many 
potential venues for appeal, the chances to be successful in breaking the policy monopoly will be 
greater. In short, they focus on the influence on the existing policy or institutions by actors who 
had insisted on change of the existing policy for a long time and finally got formal and influential 
positions, for example, a chairmanship, from which they can strongly assert their opinions.
 This study posits that the roles of actors who will become proposers of new policies or 
institutions and can use institutions and restrict opponents’ actions and can change the balance 
of power to realize policy change. For this reason, the hypothesis of this study has been made by 
referring to the idea of Schickler (2001) as well as the notion of Baumgartner and Jones (2009). 
 In the case of public works, including highways, there are actors who have benefited from 
existing policy. For example, special revenue sources for highway projects made the projects 
sustainable. In this way, highway projects become a source of votes for politician. Thus, to change 
the policy monopoly form from which the highway group had benefited, it is important for the anti-
highway group to obtain influence in the decision-making process.
 Considering these previous studies and the features of public works, This study sets the 
hypothesis that “When anti-highway groups who can play a policy entrepreneurial role obtain a 
position from which they can formally reflect their opinions in decision-making and then break the 
equilibrium between pro-highway and anti-highway groups, the highway policy will be changed.”
 Further, this study attempts to support this hypothesis with case studies. To put it concretely, 
this study tries to extract the factors that made the revision of the act of 1991 possible based on the 
angle of analysis by examining: the fiscal conditions at that time; congressional composition; the 
relationships among Congress, president, and each political party; and the roles of legislators who 
proposed the idea of revision of the 1991 act.
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Common Features in the Road Systems between the United States and Japan  
and Differences after Reform of Their Systems
 In Japan, large parts of budget sources are concentrated in the hands of the central government, 
which also has the authority to allocate those budget sources. On the other hand, local governments 
do not have sufficient budget resources to implement their works. The portion of their own income 
is about 30 percent. As a result, local governments depend on the transfer of budget resources 
as local allocation tax (Chiho kofuzei) and national treasury disbursements (Kokko hojokin) 
from the central government (Figure 1). This situation is the same in public works (Figure 2). 
Even though the Koizumi cabinet transferred the some tax authority to local governments, the 
increased percentage of local tax was small, and the financial system between the central and local 
governments did not change.
Recourse: Local finance white book, 2011
Figure 1
Recourse: Local finance white book, 2011
Figure 2
 The United States, on the other hand, has Federalism. Normally, states have authority and state 
assemblies decide rules for daily life. In other words, states have autonomy. Thus, laws differ 
among states. Penal regulations are different in each state, for example, as are requirements for 
lawyers, doctors, pharmacists, and driving licenses. Even in presidential elections, the polling 
systems and the procedures for vote counting are not unified among states or counties. And in 
case of financial systems of states, there is no adjustment system of finance among states or 
municipalities.13) Even though states and local municipalities get intergovernmental revenue such 
as grant-in aid that was 20.93 percent (of general revenue) in 2009 (Figure 3) from the federal 
government, they manage their administrative projects by their tax or other budget resources. 
In short, because the United States has a federal system and Japan has a much more centralized 
system, their financial systems differ.
 The highway system, however, is unique in U.S. federalism. It was centralized for a long 
time. States depended on the federal government for highway money and they were restricted 
by the federal government when they constructed highways. When states and local governments 
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constructed highways, their choices and procedures had to be approved by the Federal Bureau of 
Public Roads. In addition, the choice of highways was decided between the federal government and 
the states’ departments of transportation (DOTs). Local governments were kept out in the loop. As 
a result, it was not easy for local governments to reflect their voice in the choice of highways until 
1991. Due to these special features, there were similarities between the U.S. highway system and 
the Japanese road system.
 There are four main points of similarity between Japan and the United States.
 First, there are special revenue sources. The United States has special revenue sources for 
highway projects and, as such, can implement projects constantly. Special revenue for highways 
includes taxes gasoline, diesel, special fuel (liquefied petroleum gas and liquefied natural gas), tire, 
truck and trailer sales, and heavy vehicle use. The Japanese government has also special revenue 
for road projects. Special revenue road projects existed until 2009. Special revenue included taxes 
on gasoline, liquefied petroleum gas, motor vehicles, local road transfers, transfers, motor vehicle 
transfers, light oil deliveries, and automobile acquisitions. After 2009, these taxes became general 
sources of revenue.
 Second, both countries have special funds. The special revenue sources come from the federal 
governments. As can be seen in Table 1, special revenue sources are allocated to the Highway 
Trust Fund, which is under the Federal government’s control. Special revenue sources will then be 
transferred to the states and local municipalities. In other words, the federal government gathers 
money and divides it among the states and local governments.14) The proportion of Federal fund in 
state funding for highway was 26.7 percent in 2008 (Figure 4). Japan has a similar system. There 
are two accounts in the central government: general and special. Some of the special accounts have 
special revenue sources. Special revenue sources are assigned to special accounts and used for 
special projects. The special accounts are under the jurisdiction of each ministry and each ministry 




























REVENUES USED FOR HIGHWAYS - BY COLLECTING AGENCIES
Highway User Revenues:
Motor-Fuel and Vehicle 
Taxes 30,835 - 30,835 51,439 2,578 84,852 46.61%
 Tolls - - - 7,539 1,761 9,300 5.11%
Subtotal 30,835 - 30,835 58,978 4,339 94,152 51.72%
Other Taxes and Fees:
Property Taxes 
and Assessments - - - 8,322 8,322 4.57%
General Fund 
Appropriations 8,017 2,561 10,578 6,819 22,998 40,395 22.19%
Other Taxes and Fees - 471 471 7,009 4,966 12,446 6.84%
Subtotal 8,017 3,032 11,049 13,828 36,286 61,163 33.60%
Investment Income and 
Other Receipts 21 - 21 10,617 6,833 17,471 9.60%
Total Current Income 38,873 3,032 41,905 83,422 47,458 172,785 94.91%
Bond Issue Proceeds - - 14,264 5,669 19,933 10.95%
Grand Total Receipts 38,873 3,032 41,905 97,686 53,127 192,718 105.86%
Intergovernmental Payments:
Federal Government:
 Highway Trust Fund (35,419) (35,419) 35,269 150 - -
All Other Funds - (1,658) (1,658) 744 914 - -
State Agencies:
 Highway-User Imposts - - - (11,377) 11,377 - -
 All Other Funds - - - (3,450) 3,450 - -
Local Governments - - - 2,400 (2,400) - -
Subtotal (35,419) (1,658) (37,077) 23,586 13,491 -
Funds Drawn from or Placed 
in Reserves (1,922) - (1,922) (7,119) (1,619) -5.86%
Total Funds Available 1,532 1,374 2,906 114,153 64,999 100%
Recourse: Federal Highway Administration, Highway Statistics, 2008 (Millions of dollars)
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was a unified social infrastructure special account in FY 2008, the resource had been used for 
all roads including highways. Local governments depend on national disbursement in their road 
construction projects16) (Figure 2).
 Every year, about $30 billion enters the Highway Trust Fund in the United States, and about ¥3 
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trillion is gathered by the fuel taxes in Japan. The usage of the money might be an important issue 
in both countries when fiscal conditions are severe.
 Third, there is a similarity in intergovernmental relationships in the national highway and road 
projects’ decision-making systems. “Intergovernmental relationships” means the relationship 
between the federal government and states or local municipalities in the United States and the 
relationship between the central and local governments in Japan.
 Prior to ISTEA (1991), local governments did not have authority in decision-making in the 
Federal-Aid Highway System. At that time, the Federal-Aid Highway System was divided as 
follows: Interstate highways, federal-aid primary system, federal-aid secondary system, and 
urban system.17) The projects of the federal-aid primary system selected by each state’s highway 
department were subject to the approval of the Bureau of Public Roads. The projects of the federal-
aid secondary system that were chosen by state highway departments or local road officials 
cooperatively were also subject to the same approval.
 After 1991, these categories were changed, and Federal-Aid Highway System was divided into 
two types. One was the National Highway System (NHS), which includes Interstate and other 
highways, and the other was Federal-Aid Roads.
 In Japan, roads are divided into national highways, national roads, prefectural roads, and city, 
town and village roads. Normally, local governments do not have to get approval for their roads 
from the central government. But they have to follow the laws and regulations enacted by central 
government, for example, the Road Law (Doro ho) or Road Structural Government Ordinance (Doro 
kozo rei) when they implement road projects. In addition, roads are appointed as national roads by 
government ordinance, even if they are in local areas; roads that are between national roads and 
cities that need to be developed for the nation overall or for special construction or arrangements 
will become national roads18). So, there are many national roads in Japan. Moreover, local 
governments did not obtain explanations from the central government about spending in the money 
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allotted to them for implementing projects under the direct control of the central government.
 That is to say, state or local governments are influenced by the federal or central government 
in road administration in both the United States and Japan. The Federal government or central 
government has the budget for national highways or roads and makes regulations for them that 
states or local governments have to obey.
 Fourth, in general, public works including highways have played roles in social infrastructure, 
job creation, and regional development. Due to those features, public works have contributed to 
the reelection of politicians because local governments and people desire such projects for the 
development of their regions. In other words, bringing public works to a congressman’s election 
district is one of the important ways to gather votes for reelection. This political role of public 
works has been called pork barrel politics.19)
 Because of the above-mentioned political roles, even if local governments or local residents 
complain about centralized highway systems in the United States or Japan, it is difficult to change 
the system of public works and the system has been perpetuated because it benefits legislators, 
bureaucrats, and the construction industry. It was for this reason, in fact, that Reagan failed to 
reform the highway system. In Japan, Koizumi could not implement the generalization of special 
resource revenue of roads in 2002. Moreover, decentralization of road projects has not made any 
progress since the 1990’s.
Differences between the United States and Japan in the Usage of Gasoline Tax after 
Reauthorization
 Both Japan and the United States have had gasoline tax as a special revenue source for roads 
projects, and there have been commonalities in the way of carrying out national road or highway 
construction between the two countries. The United States and Japan, however, went in different 
directions after system reforms in each country.
 First, there is a difference in usage of gasoline tax. In Japan, the ratio of highway expenditure 
within public works expenditure did not change after the generalization of special revenue source 
for roads projects in 2009 (Figure 5). Even though, the ratio of highway expenditure changed after 
2008 (the Fukuda Cabinet promised generalization), the ratio gradually returned to the ratio of 
2007. And the percentage of maintenance and repair in road investments by the central government 
from 2004 to 2009 is only between 6 percent and 10 percent (Figure 6). In the United States, the 
highway expenditure is high, as noted in Figure 7. The highway expenditure in the federal spending 
for infrastructure, however, is used not only for new construction, but also for maintenance. And 
the percentage of maintenance in highway expenditure in the federal spending for infrastructure has 
been almost 100 percent since the 1990’s (Figure 8 and 9).
 Second, there is a difference in the flexibility of project choices by local governments when they 
use money from gasoline taxes from the federal government in the U.S and or central government 
in Japan. In Japan, even though consolidated subsidies are increasing, the percentage is not so high, 
and it is difficult for local governments to change projects that are related to specific subsidies 
from the central government. On the contrary, even though states get money for highways from the 
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federal highway fund, they can choose and use it not only for highways, but also for other projects 
like public transportation.
 Third, there is a difference in the participation of local governments and residents in the 
process of decision-making. In Japan, public participation systems were introduced in individual 
laws relating to public works from the last half of the 1990’s. It is difficult, however, for local 
governments to reflect their ideas in the projects that are under the direct control of the central 
government. And it is also difficult for local residents to reflect their voices in central government 
projects. Most of their participation will be allowed after a project is decided and they are in the 
phase of implementation.
 On the contrary, after ISTEA was enacted, in the United States, states must develop long-
range transportation plans and short-range transportation improvement strategies for all areas 
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Resource: Public Spending on Transportation and Water Infrastructure, 2010
Figure 8
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within the state in cooperation with the affected MPOs in metropolitan areas and with the affected 
local governments in nonmetropolitan areas. Also, states need to consult with local government 
officials when selecting transportation projects in areas with populations of less than 50,000 
and with MPOs in areas with larger populations. MPOs were required to prepare a long-range 
transportation plan for their metropolitan areas in consultation with state transportation officials 
and also required to prepare short-range transportation improvement plans for their metropolitan 
areas in consultation with state transportation officials.20) In addition, MPOs select projects in 
consultation with state officials. Further after ISTEA, MPOs have chances to select their projects 
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on their own without the state’s approval. In particular, reflecting the needs of local stakeholders 
become an important element in planning. More concretely, ISTEA placed significant emphasis 
on broadening participation in transportation planning to include key stakeholders, not only key 
transportation providers,21) but also those who have not traditionally been involved, including the 
business community, members of public community groups, and other governmental agencies. 
This challenges transportation professionals and elected officials because meaningful engagement 
of diverse interests can be difficult. ISTEA calls for a broader participation, however, that should 
ensure that decisions will be more responsive to local needs.22)
 As mentioned above, Japan and the United States had similar systems of public works earlier. 
But ISTEA was enacted to ensure the participation of local governments and residents and the 
flexibility of the usage of money from the central government by states or local governments and 
these aspects were more promoted than in Japan.
 Generally speaking, it is difficult to change the system of public works because actors who 
have vested interests will resist the change. So, why did policy change along with system change 
as mentioned above succeed in the United States? This study will investigate the process of 
ISTEA enactment and decentralization from the federal government to MPOs by this act from 
congressional discussions and interviews. Following this, there will be an analysis of the factors 
related to highway policy changes according to the hypothesis of this study.
Notes
1)  I am really grateful to Prime Minister Fukuda for granting me an interview. I also appreciate the 
kindness of Mark Guenard of the Massachusetts Department of Transport (DOT) for allowing me to 
meet with him. In addition, I am really thankful to Professor David Kind for giving me his time and 
advice to understand politics U.S. congressional. Moreover, I am really grateful to Professor Susan J. 
Pharr and Professor Shiju Fujihira for having invited in Harvard University.
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2)  In Japan, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport estimates the percentage of roads and 
bridges that will pass more than 50 years are 25% in 2009. And the total of new constructions projects, 
maintenance projects, renewal projects, and restoration from disaster projects will exceed the amount of 
possible expenditure if the Ministry continue to invest in the same way. MLIT (2011) pp. 34–35.
3)  The models of Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPOs) established in the 1960’s. In early 
1960’s, the federal government required regional agencies to conduct “continuing, comprehensive 
and coordinated” (3-C) transportation planning. At that time and later, however, MPOs played merely 
advisory roles and state officials allocated funds and chose projects. North Jersey Transportation 
Planning Authority (1998) p. 21.
4)  Dilger (1992) pp. 67. Dilger mentioned the important feature of ISTEA is a “landmark of legislation 
that makes revisions in the federal government’s role in transportation and provides state and, especially, 
local policy makers with an unprecedented opportunity to determine the future direction of the nation’s 
transportation system”.
5)  After 1987, the Federal Aid Highway Act incorporated into the Surface Transportation and Uniform 
Relation Assistance Act. This act is also expired on the appointed day and has been revised.
6)  Hall (1993) pp. 278–292. And Hogwood and Peters classify policy change into Policy Innovation, 
Policy Maintenance, Policy Succession and Policy Termination from aspects of change of organization, 
law and revenue in each level. Hogwood and Peters (1983) pp. 14–20, 26–29.
7)  It is a special word for a legislator in the Diet who has special influence on specific policy that he/her 
is interested in because of his/ her experiences in the Political Affairs Research Committee in LDP, in a 
Diet committee, or in the Cabinet. Zoku-Giin has a relation with the Ministry that has jurisdiction over 
that policy and has connections to industries or companies influenced by that policy. For more detail, 
see, Takashi, Inoguchi and Iwai (1987).
8)  Schickler (2001) pp. 12–18.
9)  Policy monopoly is similar to the terms iron triangle or policy subsystem whereby some group can 
gain some control in the policy making process of a particular policy.
10) Baumgartner and Jones (2009) p. 240.
11) Positive feedback means changes that come quickly and dramatically, as opposed to negative 
feedback in which issues change incrementally.
12) Baumgartner and Jones (2009), pp. 16–18, 235–251.
13) Kubo etc (2010) pp. 53, 182–183, 188–189.
14) As this table 1 shows, in 2008, the federal government paid $35,269 million dollars to states and D.C 
and $150 million to local governments from $35,419 million of the Highway Trust fund.
  Previously, this fund had only one account, but it was divided into Highway Accounts, Mass Transit 
accounts and the Leaking Underground Storage Tank Trust Fund.
15) In the case of public works, more concretely, there were the road equipment special account, the 
flood control special account, the harbor equipment special account, airport equipment special account, 
and the urban development resource financial special account which were under the jurisdiction of 
the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport. These special accounts were unified to the social 
infrastructure projects special account in FY 2008. The National land improvement projects special 
account and the national forest and field special account are also used for public works but under the 
jurisdiction of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries.
16) After the privatization of the road public corporation in 2003, some of non-profitable highway 
projects come under the control of the central government.
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17) In the United States, until 1991, roads were categorized into Federal-Aid Highways and other roads. 
Other roads, for example, state roads, county roads and city roads, did not receive federal-aid. The 
federal-aid primary system were the roads that would surround routes of the Interstate System and other 
important routes. It was a system that connected main highways. The federal-aid secondary system 
consisted of the principal secondary and feeder routes, for example, farm-to-market roads, rural mail 
and public school bus routes, local rural roads, county and township roads, county roads, and their urban 
extensions. Smith (1958) p. 228, Stanfield (1982).
18) The national roads are the roads that comprise the nationwide road network with national highways 
and meet the following conditions; the roads that connect the capitals of the prefectures and cities 
with particular importance in politics, economy, or culture, and the roads that are between national 
roads and important cities or the cities with over 100,000 in population, and the roads that are between 
national roads and cities that need to be developed for the nation overall or for special construction or 
arrangements. Road law (Douro hou) article 5.
19) Stephen and Samuel (1952). In pork barrel politics, the distribution of public works expenditures on 
the basis of political influence has been applied most frequently and to the legislation processed by the 
House Public Works Committee.
20) Diliger (1992) p. 74.
21) Transportation providers include transit agencies, state and local highway departments, airport 
authorities, marine operators, rail-freight operators, Amtrak, port operators, private providers of public 
transportation, and others. See, Federal Highway Administration and Federal Transit Administration “The 
transportation planning process key issues”, p. 4.
22) Federal Highway Administration, U.S DOT (1996) p. 5.
  Based on the interview that the author conducted with Mass DOT, in the case of Massachusetts, 
the relationship among the states and delegations of local municipalities is as follows. There are 13 
MPOs and each MPO includes communities to which cities and towns belong. Usually, more than 
five communities forms sub-region. The sub-region delegation is selected by an election in that sub-
region. The sub-region delegations work as volunteers. The people who can attend MPO meetings 
are delegations of each sub-region, chairmen of Regional Planning Agencies (RPA), and public 
transportation and highway departments of M.A.
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